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ABSTRACT 
The rulemaking function of the executive branch of government is a fact of 
life in modern democratic states. In terms of development, the importance of 
secondary legislation is growing in both the quantitative and qualitative sense. 
Because it represents a deviation from the principle of the separation of powers, 
secondary legislation receives a great deal of attention in both theory and case 
law. From a comparative standpoint, one can note a wide range of approaches 
to this question. It could be said that the American approach is pragmatic and 
flexible, while the Slovenian approach is dogmatic and rigid. In the former, the 
delegation of rulemaking authority to the executive branch is not problematic 
provided adequate mechanisms for legal and political oversight are in place; of 
these mechanisms, special emphasis is placed on the procedure for shaping 
secondary legislation and the public’s participation therein. In the latter, the 
executive branch is still always looked upon with distrust, which is why this 
approach persists in delegating as narrow and substantively precise powers as 
possible to the executive branch. Although the main burden of the democratic 
legitimization of the executive branch is still borne by the law, the importance of 
the procedure for shaping secondary legislation, and within its framework the 
possibilities for public participation, has been increasing. 
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1 Introduction 
The rulemaking function of the executive branch of government 
constitutes a deviation from the ideal of the principle of separation of 
powers, according to which the executive branch is to issue only concrete 
individual acts of administrative legislation in the process of public 
administration. In modern states, this deviation is accepted as a fact of 
life, as it is beyond argument that it would not be possible to make this 
ideal a reality because the number of matters which must be regulated, 
abstractly and in terms of general law, is so great and these matters so 
complex that they surpass the abilities of the legislature to regulate them 
itself through its own legislative acts. 
In this regard, the authority to determine abstract and general legal 
rules, the so-called rulemaking authority, is divided between the legislative 
and executive branches of government. By way of comparison, it may be 
noted that there exist different models of this division. For the purpose of 
this contribution, the most important difference is between the model 
which acknowledges that the executive branch has what is called original 
rulemaking authority and the model which only acknowledges the 
derivative rulemaking authority of executive branch. The difference 
between the two models lies in the fact that in the second model, the 
executive branch may use rules to regulate only those matters specified by 
the legislature, and may do so only to the extent and in the manner 
determined by the latter. These constraints do not exist in the first model. A 
comparative overview reveals that a vast majority of modern legal systems 
are based on the so-called derivative model1, with differences existing 
between individual models. In this contribution, the rulemaking function of 
the executive branch will be analyzed using the example of the American 
and Slovenian legal orders. The purpose of the contribution is to identify 
similarities and differences between the two systems and to seek out 
solutions that the two models could potentially offer one another. 
                                              
1 An example of the original model can be found in France, where the constitution grants 
the executive branch of government inherent legislative authority. Article 34 of the 
Constitution of France of 1958 lists the domains reserved for legislative regulation (the so-
called domaine reserve); already in the Constitution, all other domains are under the 
authority of the executive branch (Article 37 of the Constitution of France) (Wade & 
Forsyth, 2004, p. 874). 
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2 The American system 
2.1 Introduction 
In American theory and legal practice, the question of the transfer of 
rulemaking authority from Congress to the executive branch of 
government is dealt with in the framework of the doctrine of 
nondelegation, which took shape on the basis of two fundamental 
constitutional principles – the principle of the separation of powers and 
the principle of checks and balances. In interpretations of the substance of 
this doctrine and in its use in practice, a key role was played by the case 
law of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
2.2 Historical foundations 
Historical development in the United States is based on foundations 
of a different kind than those found in most other states, where the 
modern state was created on the basis of a struggle between the feudal 
order and the middle classes, because the United States was from the very 
start a state of the middle classes. Although the Constitution ratified in 
1787 does not explicitly mention the separation of powers 2, its substance 
makes it undoubtedly clear that this separation is one of the fundamental 
constitutional principles. In line with this separation, Congress is granted 
the legislative function, the President is granted the executive function, and 
the courts are granted the judicial function.3 
The question of delegating legislative powers was not even put before 
the Constitutional Convention, as the creators of the United States 
Constitution found Montesquie’s classic conception of a separation of 
powers to be convincing and realizable. However, soon after the 
Constitution was adopted, it became evident that there exists a void 
between the norm and the needs of practice. 
                                              
2 The same is true of checks and balances and administrative agencies (Strauss et al., 
2003, p. 102). 
3  A closer view shows that the US Constitution and other legislation in a number of 
important fields does not strictly differentiate the three branches, but that they overlap, 
which is why "checks and balances" would be a more accurate label for their mutual 
functioning than "separation of powers". This is confirmed by a historical overview of the 
viewpoints of theory, among which the views of James Madison on the point of 
overlapping and oversight are particularly important (Federalist Papers No. 47 and No. 
48) (Brugger, 2001, pp. 212–213). 
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2.3 Legislative practice 
Congress addressed the abovementioned void by beginning to 
delegate a portion of its powers to the President and the federal 
administrative agencies he was establishing.4 The problem of delegation 
became especially irksome the moment Congress began establishing 
independent agencies, administrative agencies which were not under the 
direct oversight of the President, and granting them increasingly extensive 
(regulatory) powers. From this point on, theory speaks of the emergence 
of the modern administrative state5, the continued development of which 
has drawn a question mark over certain classic doctrines of constitutional 
law.6 
In all periods, Congress has widely made use of the case law of the 
US Supreme Court, which has taken (with two exceptions – see below) a 
favorable view of delegation. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
authorizations were becoming increasingly broad and vague, which led to 
the appearance of a type of legislation which some labeled "skeleton 
legislation".7 In present times, in a number of cases the executive branch 
of government has delegated authority without any substance guidelines 
for orientation, and has often been satisfied with a mere formal 
delegation – »here’s the problem – deal with it«.8 
                                              
4 Congress may delegate its powers directly to the President or to federal administrative 
agencies, regardless of whether they are directly subordinate to him or not. If powers are 
delegated to the President, he may transfer them to federal administrative agencies (with 
an executive order, for example). One example of this would be the Economic Stabilization 
Act 1970. In practice, authority is mostly delegated directly to federal administrative 
agencies, and in the framework of the latter to federal independent regulatory agencies. 
Institutionally, therefore, Congress has no limits when delegating authority. (Pünder, 1995, 
p. 80; Strauss et al., 2003, p. 72). 
5 Although administrative agencies had had an important role even earlier, most theory 
regards the New Deal period as the turning point (Strauss et al., 2003, p. 103). 
6 As one of the most important characteristics of the modern administrative state, one part 
of theory has labeled independent administrative agencies the "headless fourth branch of 
government", a label which indicates the controversial nature, from the perspective of 
constitutional law, of their position (see Federal Trade Commission v. Ruberoid Co., 343 
U.S. 470 (1952)). 
7 Similarly, in modern German theory there is talk of so-called Grundsätze-, Grundlage-, 
and Stammgesetz (see Zippelius & Müller (eds.), 1989, p. 247). 
8 Pünder, 1995, p. 44 and 51–52. 
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2.4 Case law 
Legislation which delegated the powers of Congress to the executive 
branch was from the outset challenged before the US Supreme Court. In 
terms of development, the case law of the US Supreme Court regarding 
delegated legislation can be roughly broken down into three phases: 1) 
shaping the doctrine of nondelegation, 2) distancing itself from this 
doctrine, with a brief exception during the time of the New Deal 
legislation, and 3) the shedding of this doctrine in present times.9 
2.4.1 Shaping the doctrine of nondelegation 
Case law at first reacted harshly to the phenomenon of delegation, 
citing the addage "delegata postestas non potest delegatari ", which 
originated in England, and adopting the standpoint that Congress may 
not delegate its rulemaking function. This became known as the doctrine 
of nondelegation.10 
It soon became clear that a strict separation of powers could not be 
implemented in practice, which is why the US Supreme Court softened the 
doctrine of nondelegation. In the cases The Brig Aurora11 and Field v. 
Clark12 it took the stance that it is not unconstitutional delegation if the 
existence of certain conditions which trigger legal consequences already 
foreseen by the law is merely confirmed (the so-called contingency 
rationale)13, and in Wayman v. Southard14 it separated important matters 
from less important ones and allowed delegation in the case of the latter if 
it was limited to defining details. 15 In the first 150 years of case law, 
                                              
9 See Strauss et al., 2003, p. 66. Cf. Asimow et al. (1998, pp. 397–413), who break 
down the development into two phases: from Field to the New Deal, and from the New 
Deal to the present. 
10 Brugger, 2001, p. 214; Mashaw et al., 2003, p. 59; Pünder, 1995, pp. 40–41. 
11 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813). 
12 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
13 Mashaw et al., 2003, p. 60; Brugger, 2001, p. 214; Strauss et al., 2003, pp. 66–67; 
for a critical view, Bonfield and Asimow, 1988, p. 433, feel that the Court did not abide 
by the principles it defended. 
14 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.), p. 11 sl. (1825). Although this case otherwise pertained to the 
delegation of rulemaking authority to the courts, it is also considered a leading case for 
administration (Pünder, 1995, p. 41, note 15). 
15 Congress must therefore decide on the most important matters itself, and the executive 
branch may only work out the details (compare with German theory and the so-called 
Parlamentsvorbehalt or parliamentary approval). While this case was never formally 
overruled, in practice it is no longer important in this regard, as even when ruling on 
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the US Supreme Court therefore used theories of contingency and details 
to uphold the validity of all of the challenged legislation.16 Although a 
strict, uncompromising diction was used, delegation was nonetheless 
upheld by minimizing its importance – one of the instruments used was the 
argumentation that it’s not about law, but facts.17 And yet this point of 
view is problematic, because it is de facto about more than that – it is 
about value judgments as to what law is to be, which implies shaping the 
law and actually erasing the boundary between the creation and use of 
legislation.18 
The formation of actual case law in the field of delegation came 
about only at the end of the nineteenth century, when with the emergence 
of modern administration the United States entered the period of the 
modern administrative state. Due to economic development and the 
growth of external trade following the Civil War, a huge increase in the 
need for regulation occurred. This need could not be met by Congress 
alone, and delegation became a matter of necessity, which in turn created 
a need for a clear answer to the question of the acceptability and extent of 
delegation. At first, the US Supreme Court was skeptical of delegation, yet 
it soon became clear that it would not strictly enforce its view. While in its 
rulings the Supreme Court underlined the existence of the doctrine of 
nondelegation, it gave a broad interpretation of this doctrine, and now 
demanded of Congress only that the purpose and substance of the 
legislative powers be sufficiently clear to guide the actions of the executive 
branch, which also enables oversight by the courts (intelligible 
principle/primary standard).19 The reformulated doctrine of nondelegation 
therefore demanded of Congress only that it clearly delineate 
authorizations or standards; it made judgments of the acceptability of 
delegation almost entirely subject to the free discretion of the US Supreme 
Court, as the test of the judgment of constitutional law had been 
                                                                                                          
human rights, the US Supreme Court avoids setting detailed substantive limitations for 
Congress (Pünder, 1995, p. 49; for an opposing view, see Brugger, 2001, p. 216). 
16  The first was used in cases where authority was delegated to the president for 
determining the conditions of international trade, and the other, which was upheld longer, 
for other cases of delegation (Pünder, 1995, p. 41). 
17 Brugger, 2001, p. 214. 
18 Strauss et al., 2003, p. 63 and 92; Gellhorn & Levin, 2006, pp. 12–13; Asimow et al., 
1998, p. 398. For this reason, Pünder (1995, p. 41, note 23) concludes that the Supreme 
Court did not adhere to its own principals, which is why its rulings were said to lack logic. 
19 See the case J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. V. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (409) [1928]. 
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imprecise and enabled different interpretations of the doctrine of 
nondelegation.20 
Until the 1930s, the US Supreme Court did not rule that an act of 
delegation of legislative powers had been unconstitutional, from which it 
follows that the doctrine of nondelegation was considered a hollow 
formality. 21  Due to changed economic circumstances case law soon 
underwent a serious test, which is why it was changed for a short time. 
2.4.2 The consistent use of the doctrine of nondelegation 
in the era of New Deal legislation 
In two rulings in the 1930s, the US Supreme Court22 for the first (and 
last) time23 ruled that an authorization had been unconstitutional. It took 
the stance that intelligibility of the authorization (the intelligible principle) 
meant that Congress must intelligibly define not only the purpose, but also 
the substance of the authorization.24 
In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan25 the law defined the objective of the 
authorization, yet the court was of the opinion that it did not set decision-
making standards for the President.26 In the so-called Sick Chicken27 case, 
the court once again did not find a sufficiently intelligible standard 
                                              
20 Schoenbrod, 1985, p. 1224; Pünder, 1995, pp. 42 and 44. 
21 Pünder, 1995, p. 43; Brugger, 2001, p. 214; Jaffe in: Mashaw et al., 2003, p. 61; 
Asimow et. al., 1998, p. 398. Schoenbrod (1985, p. 1269) believes that »the court was 
pretending that a law which granted wide powers did not in fact do so.« Lowi (1987, p. 
299) calls this process "legicide", and Secretary of State Hull stated that »the President 
possesses greater power than a good man wants and a bad man should have« (from 
Pünder, 1995, p. 45). 
22 Brugger (2001, p. 215) lists Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) as a third 
case. Here, wide regulatory powers were delegated to a subject of private law. 
23 Mashaw et al., 2003, p. 61 and Asimow et al., 1998, p. 399. 
24 These were early cases of New Deal legislation, which soon fell out of favor along with 
most elements of Roosevelt’s constituency (Mashaw et al., 2003, p. 61; Pünder, 1995, p. 
46; Asimow et al., 1998, p. 399; Brugger, 2001, p. 214–215). 
25 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
26 Judge Cardozo took a different stance in this case – in his opinion, the separation of 
power needn’t be strictly, pedantically adhered to, but must be approximated in a sensible 
manner and elastically adapted to the needs of the practice of administration, as future 
development in all its infinite diversity cannot be seen in advance (from Brugger, 2001, p. 
215). This can be considered a functionalist approach to the problem of the separation of 
powers. 
27 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) – the Court ruled 
unanimously in this case (Mashaw et al., 2003, p. 62; Strauss et al., 2003, p. 69). 
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for decision-making, and furthermore warned that the wide powers which 
had been delegated were not linked to procedural clauses which would 
enable the pursuit of legal objectives such as publication, suitable 
hearings, and evidence-based decision-making in the formation of rules 
or the inclusion of legal security.28 
These two decisions, which placed strict substantive demands on 
legislative powers, were harshly criticized by justices with liberal economic 
leanings since they pertained to the National Industry Recovery Act 1933, 
that is to the core of Roosevelt’s New Deal program for overcoming the 
economic crisis, the essence of which was steering the economy. It has 
been alleged that the Court’s decisions were politically motivated and that 
the Court therefore overstepped the limits of its jurisdiction.29 
2.4.3 The current situation – Shedding the doctrine of 
nondelegation 
Following the two rulings discussed above, the US Supreme Court 
returned to its earlier practice of allowing extensive delegation.30 Since the 
middle of the 1930s, it has approved all delegations31, regardless of the 
extent of the delegated powers32. By doing so it has practically "buried" 
                                              
28 Brugger, 2001, p. 215; Mashaw et al., 2003, p. 62-63; Strauss et al., 2003, p. 70. 
The Court opposed the absence of any procedure for rulemaking, and also found the 
inclusion of dominant private producers in recommending and forming rules which would 
also be valid for their competitors to be questionable (Asimow et al., 1998, p. 400). 
29 Pünder, 1995, pp. 46–47; Asimow et al., 1998, p. 399; Orlowski, 2005, p. 137; in 
the same sense, Mashaw et al., 2003, p. 63. It must be stressed that this is just one kind of 
court activism based on a formalistic view of the content of the constitution. Another type 
of activism is based on a functionalistic view of the substance of the constitution is much 
more common; it involves the search for techniques with which to keep challenged 
legislation valid (see Brown, 1991 in: Strauss et al., 2003, p. 113). 
30 An overview of the viewpoints of theory shows that the reason for this change was not 
improved legislation, but harsh criticism on account of Court’s rulings, pressure from the 
President to form a favorable majority in the Supreme Court, and in line with this the 
leaning of the majority towards flexibility when interpreting the principle of the separation 
of powers. 
31 Regulatory authorizations for private persons are an exception (Brugger, 2001, p. 216, 
note 9). 
32 General terms like "the public interest" have been sufficient, and sometimes there wasn’t 
even a content standard (Brugger, 2001, p. 216; Pünder, 1995, pp. 51–52 for the same). 
It is significant that the rulings in Yakus v. United States (321 U.S., str. 414 sl. (1944)) and 
Lichter v. United States (334 U.S. (str. 742 sl. (1948)), which were made in a time of war 
and which confirmed an wide range of powers, are still today considered the leading 
rulings in the field of delegation (Pünder, 1995, p. 48). 
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the doctrine of nondelegation, which has since only appeared in separate 
opinions.33 
This new chapter in case law regarding rulings on delegation was 
once again linked with changes in the economy, this time stemming from 
World War Two. In the middle of the twentieth century, the US Supreme 
Court began to stress the importance of effective external oversight over 
the functioning of agencies34 and developed an interpretational technique 
known as the clear statement rule, which it used to rule in cases where 
Congress had neared the constitutional threshold for delegation, thereby 
creating a less drastic measure than annulling a law on the grounds that it 
was in violation of the doctrine of nondelegation (Kent v. Dulles35).36 
In conclusion, the matter may be summarized by saying that although 
US law demands, from a theoretical standpoint, that the purpose, means, 
or extent of an authorization be specified, this is de facto not enforced by 
the US Supreme Court, which since 1935 has left decisions on the extent 
of delegation to Congress. Congress can therefore waive extensive 
powers provided that certain safeguard mechanisms are respected; when 
it does so, it cites the complexity of social relations. Unlike in the field of 
protecting human rights, in the field of delimiting authority between 
Congress and the executive branch the US Supreme Court has not 
developed a consistent theory.37 
                                              
33  Two classic examples are the stances of the Levanthal circuit court in the case 
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally and justice Rehnquist in the so-called "Benzene 
Case". In these cases, the doctrine of nondelegation experienced a rebirth. Despite this, a 
stance favoring a ban on delegation is not dominant in the US Supreme Court (Brugger, 
2001, pp. 216–217, Pünder, 1995, pp. 47–48; Asimow et al., 1998, p. 401; Mashaw et 
al., 2003, p. 63). 
34 In this framework, an important role is played not only by standards determined by law, 
but also by other standards which must enable the public, the courts and Congress to 
judge whether an administrative agency abided by legal standards. In Yakus v. United 
States (321 U.S. 414 (1944)) the court stressed the importance of the self-restraint of the 
executive branch in the sense of setting its own standards which must be adhered to. In 
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally (337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C.1971)), this was 
enhanced by taking into account earlier law and practice (Strauss et al., 2003, p. 73; 
compare Fahey v. Mallonee (332 U.S. 245 (1947))). Furthermore, the participation of the 
affected public and experts in procedures for amending general legal acts also belongs in 
the framework of agency oversight. The key phrase is "from standards to safeguards". 
35 357 U.S. 116 (1958). 
36 Strauss et al., 2003, p. 72. 
37 Pünder, 1995, pp. 49 and 51–52; Orlowski, 2005, p. 137; Mashaw et al., 2003, pp. 
64–65; Brugger, 2001, p. 218; Asimow et al., 1998, pp. 410–413. 
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2.5 Theoretical viewpoints 
The viewpoints of American theory are not uniform, and this is 
reflected in the stances of individual Supreme Court justices and vice 
versa. When reviewing theoretical viewpoints, one must keep in mind that 
theorists use different methodological approaches to address this 
question. The most common are the formalist approach and the 
functionalist approach.38 Formalists adhere to the literal meaning of the 
wording of the Constitution and the original intent of its writers, and rarely 
if ever take into account changed circumstances and broader objectives 
such as sound, effective administration, while for functionalists the sharing 
of powers and the establishment of mutual alliances is not problematic 
provided the fundamental principles of the separation of powers are not 
compromised. It follows that although the Constitution separates the 
branches of power in order to guarantee the freedom of the individual, at 
the same time it expects practice to connect all of this into an effective 
system of administration (workable government). 
On these foundations, two opposing theoretical viewpoints on the 
constitutionality of the administrative state, the essence of which lies in 
strengthening the rulemaking authority of the executive branch, may now 
be presented. The central problem that all three main actors, that is 
Congress, the US Supreme Court, and theory, face is the relationship 
between the needs of current practice and a Constitution that is over 200 
years old and that still serves as a basic standard for the (political) 
legitimacy of the work of bodies of state.39 To paraphrase, it is a problem 
of squaring the circle. Lawson for example believes that the post-New 
Deal administrative state is unconstitutional, and defends his views with, 
among other things, the fact that the doctrine of nondelegation is not 
enforced.40 Strauss, on the other hand, feels that it is pointless to pretend 
that it would be possible to clearly separate the bodies of state into three 
categories, and stresses that the essence lies in the way that oversight over 
administrative agencies is conducted by a uniform, politically accountable 
leadership of the executive branch, and in the existence of tensions and 
rivalries between all three constitutional institutions, which prevents any 
one of them from becoming dominant and consequently obstructing 
                                              
38 For other theories, see Strauss et al., 2003, pp. 112–118. 
39 Strauss et al., 2003, pp. 101–102; similarly, Mashaw et al., 2003, p. 64. 
40 Lawson in: Strauss et al., 2003, p. 103. 
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the will and oversight of the people. 41  Lindseth concludes that the 
development of the administrative state in the US after World War Two 
points to the formation of a compromise, in accordance with which a 
concentration of power in the hands of the executive branch is tolerated, 
from the standpoint of constitutional law, provided that, on a 
subconstitutional level, it is subjected to a spectrum of political and legal 
oversight mechanisms which function as a substitute for formal structural 
safeguards of the principle of the separation of powers.42 One of these 
mechanisms is an open and accountable process for shaping secondary 
legislation.43 
3 The Slovenian system 
3.1 Introduction  
The Slovenian legal order rests on the principle of the separation of 
powers, yet it does not enforce it in its ideal form. Following the example 
of other modern democratic systems, it takes account of actual 
circumstances and thus foresees the possibility of the executive branch of 
government having a rulemaking function. Limits to the latter are set by 
the principles of a democratic republic and rule of law and by the 
principle of the legality of the functioning of the executive branch (the 
legality principle), which is derived from the rule of law. On the basis of 
these theoretical guidelines, the Constitutional Court has defined the 
substance of these principles in greater detail in its case law. 
3.2 Historical foundations 
Before the independence of the Republic of Slovenia, its territory was 
a constituent part of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, the 
legal order of which made reference to human rights, but did not 
acknowledge them in practice. Although power in the state was organized 
in line with the principle of the uniformity of power, both Yugoslavian and 
Slovenian administrative law theory developed a very consistent theory in 
the field of the rulemaking function of the executive branch. The substance 
of this theory was quite similar to that of German theory, and its 
foundation was clearly defined boundaries which the executive branch 
                                              
41 Strauss in: Strauss et al., 2003, p. 109 et seq. 
42 Lindseth, 2004, p. 1345. 
43 See Rose-Ackerman, 1994, p. 1280. 
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may not cross when making rules. The independence of the Republic of 
Slovenia therefore does not represent a turning point in this field of legal 
theory, as the viewpoints previously developed by Slovenian theory were 
also quite suitable for the new system of administrative law. Contemporary 
theory took them over, and the Constitutional Court built on them with its 
case law. 
3.3 Legislative practice 
Statistical data show that 2,193 laws and 14,040 pieces of secondary 
legislation were adopted in Slovenia between the years 1991 and 2009; 
of the latter, 3,440 were issued by the government and 10,600 were 
issued by ministers, which means that in this period approximately 110 
laws were issued each year, and that the ratio of secondary legislation to 
laws is nearly six and a half to one.44 In terms of substance, the legislative 
authorizations are much more narrow and specific than is the case in 
American legislative practice. This is because Slovenian theory and the 
case law of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia have 
taken a very rigid stance on this question. 
3.4 Case law 
Although the period in which the Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of Slovenia (hereinafter the Constitutional Court) has been ruling on the 
constitutionality and legality of the functioning of the executive branch of 
government is, in comparison to the period in which the US Supreme 
Court has been conducting this function, quite short, it is no less 
interesting and important. In this relatively short period of time, the 
Constitutional Court, working together with theory, has helped shape a 
relationship between the legislative and executive branches of government 
in a newly formed democratic state governed by the rule of law. An 
overview of case law from the Constitutional Court since 1992 shows that 
the Court ruled not only on whether the executive branch had adhered to 
the authorization it had been given for secondary legislation, but also on 
the extent of the powers that legislation granted the executive branch. 
                                              
44 Data provided in electronic form by the Office of Legislation of the Republic of Slovenia 
at the author’s request. For statistical data from the Socialist Federative Republic of 
Yugoslavia, see Horvat (1990). 
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3.4.1 Assessing the extent, transparency and specificness of 
legislative powers 
In the field of assessing the extent and specificness of legislative 
powers, one of the key decisions came in the "Abančna borzna 
posredniška hiša d.d." case 45 . In this case, the Constitutional Court 
concluded that the legislature had reasonable grounds for granting an 
administrative agency authorization to define the conditions for revoking a 
brokerage house’s license for securities trading, thereby delegating to it 
the right to resolve questions which are legal matters and as such should 
be regulated by the legislature itself, or at the very least in regards to 
which the legislature should establish a basis and framework for 
secondary regulation. 
In the "Cestno podjetje Maribor, d.d." case46, the Constitutional Court 
defined what the substance of an executive clause could be. Its stance was 
that in transferring or granting authorization for issuing executive rules, an 
executive clause may be more general (for example, one that does not 
precisely define what is to be regulated with the executive rule) or more or 
less precise (one that specifically defines the matter that the executive rule 
may regulate), whereby the decision as to which type of clause the 
legislature will choose in an individual instance falls within the field of its 
free discretion. Here it is limited only by the constitutionally defined 
relationship between the legislative and executive branches of 
government. Because the principle of the separation of powers in and of 
itself excludes the possibility that an administrative agency would change 
or independently regulate legal matters, an executive clause may not 
contain authorizations on the basis of which executive rules could contain 
clauses for which there is no prior basis in the law; in particular, agencies 
may not independently regulate rights and obligations. 
This case is also important because of the link between the question 
of the extent of legislative powers and the field of secondary legislation. 
Specifically, the Constitutional Court took the stance that it is not in 
discord with the Constitution if, in the field of public orders, the legislature 
left the broad field of its discretion to the executive branch. In the opinion 
                                              
45 Decision of the Constitutional Court of Slovenia no. U-I-287/95 of 14. 11. 1996, 
Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, no. 68/96. 
46 Decision of the Constitutional Court of Slovenia no. U-I-264/99 of 28. 09. 2000, 
Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, no. 97/2000 and OdlUS IX, 226. 
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of the Court, it is not possible to judge the merits of the measures in 
isolation due to the dual nature of public orders (which are both 
authoritative and non-authoritative); these measures must be judged in 
the framework of the macro- and microeconomic policy which governs 
the entire economy of society on the one hand and with regard to the 
function of the state, which in procedures for public orders acts as an 
economic subject, on the other. 
As a criterion for judging the allowable extent of legislative powers, 
the specific field to which the matter pertained was also taken into 
account in one of the most recent decisions, the "Freedom of Religion" 
case47 of 15 April 2010. In this case, the Constitutional Court stressed 
that the exactness of legislative clauses is linked to the meaning of the 
substance regulated by the law, and that this is also valid for the demand 
that the executive branch be bound by the law – in other words, the 
greater the degree to which a law affects or interferes with the individual’s 
fundamental rights, the more restrictive and precise the legislative powers 
should be.48 In this regard, demands for precision and restrictiveness of 
legislative powers in the field of accelerating or facilitating the functioning 
of the state are not overly strict in the opinion of the Constitutional Court. 
This is especially so if the executive branch must take account of 
constantly changing circumstances when making decisions and must do 
so under the condition that the substantive basis must be adequately 
transparent and specific so as to prevent arbitrary decisions.49 In light of 
this, the Court felt that legal norms which grant the executive branch an 
adequate substantive basis while at the same time allowing it adequate 
                                              
47 Decision of the Constitutional Court of Slovenia no. U-I-92/07 of 15. 4. 2010, Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, no. 46/2010. 
48 By citing Slovenian theory (Šturm (ed.), 2002, p. 872), in this decision the Constitutional 
Court relied on the theory of materiality (German Wesentlichkeitstheorie) developed by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court. 
49 This is why it did not annul the clauses of Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Religious 
Freedom Act, which defines an additional possibility for guaranteeing the right to religious 
provision. The Constitutional Court felt that the characteristics of the field of regulation 
demand greater room for the discretion of the executive branch, which, due to the clear 
intent of such a wide power, cannot lead to arbitrary decisions. It felt that the executive 
branch has adequate criteria and adequate guidance in the challenged legal clause, and 
at the same time that it has adequate maneuvering room for reacting to changed 
circumstances. To state the matter concretely: the competent Ministry must take into 
account different situations, in particular concrete, constantly changing data about the 
number of incarcerated persons and their religion and guarantee these persons continuous 
religious provision. 
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openness (breadth) for taking into account concrete, explicitly changing 
circumstances when dealing with secondary legislation vis-à-vis 
organizational questions are not discordant with the principle of legality. If 
we link this stance with the decision presented above, we may conclude 
that rigid demands for the exactness, specificness and breadth of 
legislative authorizations are valid for the classic authoritative (regulative) 
function of the state, within this category of functioning, and especially for 
fields pertaining to fundamental human rights and freedoms. 
3.4.2 Review of the constitutionality and legality of secondary 
legislation  
An overview of case law from the Constitutional Court since 1992 
reveals that the main decision in the field of the substantive relationship 
between the law and secondary legislation, that is the legality principle, 
came in the "Patentna pisarna d.o.o." case of 1995.50 The essence of the 
legality principle, as can be discerned from this decision, lies in the 
substantive link between the functioning of the executive branch and the 
law. The law must be a substantive basis for issuing secondary legislation 
and individual orders of the executive branch, and this holds for both the 
government and administrative agencies (so that explicit authorization 
would not be needed in the law); this function must be within the confines 
of the law both in terms of substance and as a whole. The legality 
principle from Paragraph 2 of Article 120 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Slovenia is one of the fundamental constitutional principles; it 
is linked to other constitutional principles and also refers to them. The 
principle of democracy (Article 1 of the Constitution) states, among other 
things, that representatives directly elected to parliament adopt the most 
important decisions, in particular those that pertain to citizens. As a result, 
the executive branch (the government and administrative agencies) can 
only have a legislative function on the basis of substance and within the 
framework of legislation, and not on the basis of its own regulations or 
even on the basis of its own function within the system of the separation 
                                              
50 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia no. U-I-287/95 of 14. 
11. 1996, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, no. 68/96. U-I-73/94 of 25. 5. 
1995, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, no. 37/95 and OdlUS IV, 51. From a 
developmental standpoint, the substantive "basis" of this decision is represented by 
decisions in the following cases: U-I-1/92 of 9. 7. 1992, Official Gazette of the Republic 
of Slovenia, no. 38/92 and OdlUS I, 48, U-I-72/92 of 23. 6. 1993, Official Gazette of 
the Republic of Slovenia, no. 42/93 in U-I-82/92 of 11. 11. 1993, Official Gazzete of the 
Republic of Slovenia, no. 65/93. 
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of powers. In this regard, the primacy of the law as well as the primacy of 
the legislature also have an important role in delimiting authority between 
the legislative and executive branches in accordance with the principle of 
the separation of powers (Article 3 of the Constitution). The principle of 
the rule of law (Article 2 of the Constitution) demands that the legal 
relations between the state and its citizens be regulated by laws. These are 
not only used to determine a framework and basis for the administrative-
legislative activities of the executive branch; these activities are to become 
known, transparent and foreseeable among the citizens, thus enhancing 
the legal protection of the latter. The principle of protecting human rights 
and basic freedoms (Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Constitution) 
demands that human rights and basic freedoms be limited, in accordance 
with the principle of democracy and the principle of the rule of law, only 
by the legislature at such times and to such an extent as is allowed by the 
Constitution, not the executive branch. At the same time, this principle is 
also important for the effective protection of the rights and legal interests 
of the individual, including effective oversight over the constitutionality and 
legality of individual administrative acts. According to the Constitution 
(Article 120), in their work, which includes issuing regulations, 
administrative agencies are bound by the framework determined by the 
Constitution and the law, and do not have the right to issue regulations 
without a substantive basis in the law; however, at the same time, explicit 
authorization is not required in the law. So-called executive clauses 
(legislative orders which state that such and such executive regulations 
must be issued within a given period of time) only mean that the 
legislature has not (entirely) left the issuance of executive acts to the 
discretion of the executive power, but has used legislation to assign it the 
task of regulating certain questions, and has also defined a date by which 
this is to be done. Because the principle of the separation of powers also 
excludes the possibility that an administrative agency would change or 
independently regulate legal matters, legal theory also takes the stance 
that secondary general acts should not contain clauses for which there is 
no prior basis in the law, and in particular that agencies may not 
independently regulate rights and obligations. 
In the "Lovskogospodarski načrti" case51, it summarized the essence of 
the executive nature of secondary legislation. Accordingly, we may only 
                                              
51 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia no. U-I-228/99 of 9. 
10. 2002, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, no. 91/2002 and OdlUS XI, 209. 
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speak of the execution of a law if an executive rule remains within the 
limits of the relationships regulated by the law. Therefore if it only 
describes and interprets a law, it is undoubtedly a substantively dependent 
act. An administrative act may also supplement a legal norm, but only 
insofar as this supplementation will not originally regulate social relations 
or originally set tasks for the state. It may only encompass that which of 
necessity follows from the legal norm but is not explicitly stated in it.52 An 
administrative regulation may also choose the way in which a task is to be 
accomplished, but may not originally define that task. Administrative 
agencies therefore do not have the right to issue regulations without a 
substantive basis in the law, yet an explicit authorization in the law is not 
required. 
3.4.3 Conclusion 
The "Patent pisarna d.o.o." decision can be considered the key 
decision in the field of the substantive relationship between the law and 
secondary legislation, as the Constitutional Court later referenced it in 20 
decisions in which it either annulled or removed secondary legislation due 
to a violation of the principle of the legality of the functioning of the 
executive branch. Its most recent appearance came in the ruling in the 
"Use of state and regional financial assets" case53 of 2009. Theory also 
regards this decision as key 54. 
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia references the 
standpoint of Slovenian theory in its leading decision in the field of the 
substantive relationship between the law and secondary legislation 55 . 
These viewpoints haven’t essentially changed over the past decades and 
                                              
52  In decision no. U-I-305/96 of 22. 04. 1999, Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Slovenia, no. 36/99 and OdlUS VIII, 82, the Constitutional Court emphasized that the 
extent to which a piece of secondary legislation may supplement a legislative clause 
depends on 1) the status of the secondary legislation with which the legal material is 
defined in detail in the hierarchy of legislative acts; and 2) the extent of the legislative 
powers. 
53 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia no. U-I-84/09 of 2. 7. 
2009, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, no. 55/2009. see also Decisions of 
the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia no. U-I-156/08 of 14. 4. 2011 and 
U-I-257/09 of 14. 4. 2011. 
54 See Šturm, 1998, p. 167. For an overview of the content of the legality principle and 
case law, see Šturm (1998) and the dissenting separate opinion of judge Šturm in the case 
Constitutional Court no. U-I-326/97 of 4. 6. 1998. 
55 See Šturm, 1998, p. 155, for example. 
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rely on classic German theory and constitutional court case law, and this 
decision is still referred to today. We may therefore conclude that we 
cannot speak of a development of constitutional court case law regarding 
the substantive relationship between the law and secondary legislation 
that would be comparable to the development in the United States and 
Germany. To state the matter differently: In the field of the substantive 
relationship between the law and secondary legislation, the Constitutional 
Court still stands by its viewpoint, the essence of which was formed by 
(Slovenian) theory in the 1960s. 
3.5 Theoretical viewpoints 
In terms of principles, the viewpoints of Slovenian legal theory on the 
relationship between the law and secondary legislation may be placed 
into two larger groups: the classic or rigid viewpoint and the newer or 
more flexible viewpoint. 
The classic viewpoint, which hasn’t essentially changed over the past 
forty years, can be summarized as follows: secondary legislation may not 
contain clauses that are not in the law, and in particular may not 
independently regulate new or special rights and obligations. The 
functioning of all those bodies and agencies which issue secondary 
legislation must, in terms of substance, be legally dependent, which 
means that they may only technically supplement, dissect and describe the 
law with secondary legislation. They may not interfere with the law in terms 
of substance, as this would result in the legislative function being 
transferred to other bodies. These demands must be adhered to as 
consistently as possible in all those forms of the functioning of bodies of 
state which are enforced in a one-sided, legally binding manner through 
compulsion by the authorities or even through authoritarian repression.56 
The newer stance starts from the fact that the principles of the 
separation of powers and the legality of the functioning of the executive 
branch develop in parallel and stresses that an ideal model of the 
separation of powers, in which the legislature would reach decisions 
politically and the executive power would merely interpret, dissect or 
competently execute political decisions (laws), is not practicable, or is very 
                                              
56 Šturm, 1990, p. 286. Vavpetič, Godec, Šturm and Horvat should be listed as the main 
administrative law theoreticians who defend this stance, and Kušej and Pavčnik as the 
main legal theoreticians. Besides Slovenian theoreticians, the Croatian theoretician Ivo 
Krbek should also be mentioned. 
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distant from reality, for a number of reasons. In every legal decision, even 
that which is most concrete and "executive" contains some sort of 
valuation, which is why the relationship between an "original" and an 
"derived" legal norm can never be such that the secondary norm would 
not contain original value components.57 It would also be false to claim 
that secondary legislation must not regulate rights and obligations, as a 
regulation is by definition a legal act which contains abstract and general 
legal norms, and every legal norm by definition regulates rights or 
obligations. 58 It follows that the key question is what extent of its own 
value judgments (i.e. how much original decision-making) may the 
legislature leave to the executive branch? According to the newer view, 
the relationship between the law and the executive branch cannot be 
strictly defined, which is why this view advocates looking at each case 
individually, whereby various circumstances must be taken into account 
and weighed, for which it suggests the use of a test of proportionality.59 
A part of newer theory also sees a solution in the procedure for 
shaping secondary legislation. This procedure should be constructed in 
such a way that it would give secondary legislation legitimacy, and by 
doing so would extend the democratic political process to the level of 
secondary legislation. Here it points out a number of pitfalls, among 
which the very structure of a state explicitly founded on the principle of the 
separation of powers is the greatest. Regardless, it feels that the 
rulemaking activities of the executive branch of government have for some 
time been a necessary part of administrative systems, which is why it is 
necessary to accept the fact that directly limiting the substance of the 
executive branch’s decisions with laws has its limits. With this in mind, 
                                              
57 Referring to the conclusions of Pavčnik and Bučar, in accordance with which the process 
of public administration works in such a way that on no level of the process would it be 
possible to claim that what is taking place is decision-making free of original, that is value, 
content. Every decision a person makes has by definition a value component (see Virant, 
1999, pp. 99–100). 
58 Therefore, if one interpreted Article 84 of the Slovenian Constitution to mean that the 
executive branch may not regulate rights and obligations, a situation would emerge where 
it would be nearly impossible for the executive branch to function. Author feels that this 
Constitutional clause only speaks of the duty of the state assembly to use a form of the law 
to regulate rights and obligations (see Virant, 1999, pp. 96 and 100). 
59 The matter to be weighed is on the one hand the degree of deviation from the ideal of a 
separation of powers and the meaning of the field of constitutional rights and freedoms, 
and on the other the weight of reasons given by the legislature for delegating rulemaking 
authority. See Virant (1999). 
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laws should limit the way in which decisions are made to a greater 
degree. In this regard, it would be necessary to achieve a working 
balance between substance and procedural legality, in other words a 
relationship which would still be in accordance with the essence of the 
idea of a separation of powers, that is with the system of checks and 
balances. 
4 Conclusion 
The complexity of modern problems demands the sharing of 
rulemaking authority between the legislative and executive branches of 
government; in neither the American nor the Slovenian legal system does 
the latter have a more or less free hand in rulemaking. It is characteristic 
of the Slovenian legal system, like the German legal system, that the focus 
is on the substantive relationship between the law and secondary 
legislation, while the American system places greater emphasis on the 
procedure for shaping secondary legislation. If the procedure is open and 
accountable, it constitutes an oversight mechanism that enables the 
executive branch to possess wider rulemaking authority. In the Slovenian 
legal system, the procedural aspect of forming secondary legislation has 
been gaining importance over the last decade, yet at the same time the 
question of the impact of procedural rules on the legality of substance and 
the legitimacy of secondary legislation has yet to be systematically 
addressed from the standpoint of legal theory. On the political and 
administrative levels, steps have been taken in the direction of greater 
openness and transparency in these procedures; on the level of theory, it 
will be necessary first and foremost to address the question of public 
participation in the formation of secondary legislation as an instrument for 
the democratic legitimization of the functioning of the executive branch 
and, consequently, as a tool that enables the broadening of the 
rulemaking authority of the executive branch. Here it will most of all be 
necessary to examine the relationship between the monist concept of 
democracy, from which the central role of the law in the democratic 
legitimization of the functioning of the executive branch is derived, and the 
pluralist concept, according to which the starting point is the individual 
and his ability to participate in public administration on all levels of 
decision-making. 
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